This contribution explores the implications of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) referrals under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the immunity ratione personae of officials of states that are not party to the ICC Statute. 1 While Article 13(b) of the ICC Statute allows the ICC to receive referrals of situations by the UNSC, 2 disagreement remains among authors as to when such a referral removes the customary immunity attached to a head of state of a nonstate party to the ICC Statute. In particular, it remains disputed whether the broad obligation placed on Sudan by UNSC Resolution 1593 (2005) had the implicit effect of doing so. 3 In referring the situation in Darfur (Sudan) to the ICC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UNSC determined that "the government of Sudan, and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the prosecutor pursuant to this resolution." 4 Subsequent to the adoption of this resolution, the ICC prosecutor issued an arrest warrant for President Bashir of Sudan. Yet several ICC member states failed to arrest and surrender Bashir during country visits. 5 In order to determine whether this failure to act constituted a violation of the ICC Statute, the question whether the customary immunity of a head of state before foreign national courts constituted a bar against his arrest and surrender was of
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central importance. 6 The answer to this question turns on the relationship between Articles 27(2) and 98(1) of the Rome Statute, as well as their relationship with UNSC Resolution 1593 (2005 . This essay will highlight key aspects of this relationship, taking account, among other things, of the ICC's July 2017 decision by Pre-Trial Chamber II against South Africa, 7 as well as its earlier Pre-Trial Chamber II decisions against South Africa in 2015 and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2014 respectively. 8 All these decisions rebuked the failure of these countries to arrest and surrender President Bashir during country visits, although there were differences in their reasoning.
The Relationship Between Articles 27(2) and 98(1) of the Rome Statute
Article 27(2) establishes that "[i]mmunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person." 9 In its July 2017 decision, ICC Trial Chamber II underscored that as far as parties to the Rome Statute were concerned, no immunity would apply to any individual before the ICC itself ("vertically"), and neither would it apply to the national authorities of other state parties ("horizontal") . 10 This conclusion indeed seems accurate. First, it is confirmed by the explicit references to national and international law immunities in Article 27(2). 11 Second, any other interpretation in a situation where the affected states are parties to the ICC Statute would render Article 27(2) meaningless and make it almost impossible for the ICC to obtain custody over indicted high-level perpetrators of international crimes. Given the absence of its own powers to arrest, the ICC is entirely reliant on national authorities to arrest suspects and to surrender them into the custody of the ICC. 12 Article 98(1), on the other hand, confirms the customary international immunities pertaining to high officials of nonstate parties. 13 Thus, where the ICC prosecutor wishes to arrest a high-level official of a nonstate party, he or she in principle can only proceed if the cooperation of the third state has been obtained. Put differently, the prosecutor would have to obtain a waiver of the customary immunity by the nonstate party in question, as the immunity referred to in Article 98(1) would otherwise bar arrest at the national level. 14 In its most recent decision of July 6, 2017, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II determined by majority that the consequence of the UNSC referral of the situation in Darfur to the Rome Statute was that the Rome Statute was made applicable in its entirety to the situation. 19 Specifically, the obligation to cooperate and provide any assistance to the ICC, contained in UNSC Resolution 1593 (2005), implied obligations that Sudan, as a nonstate party to the Rome Statute, would otherwise not have had. 20 As far as the situation in Darfur was concerned, it placed Sudan in the same situation as a state party to the Rome Statute. 21 As a result, Article 27(2) of the Statute applied to Sudan as if it were a state party and removed any immunity (both vis-à-vis the ICC and other ICC state parties) that would otherwise exist under international law. 22 As a consequence, the immunities referred to in Article 98(1) of the Rome Statute did not apply in relation to President Bashir. 23 In 2017 (2015) whole to Sudan (in relation to Darfur). 26 That, in turn, made it possible to extend the implications of Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute to the situation in Darfur, while making Article 98(1) of the Statute irrelevant.
Purposive Interpretation of UNSC Resolutions
Both lines of reasoning discussed above have the same consequence in that customary immunity does not form a barrier at any level of the proceedings. In the view of this author, both lines of reasoning are equally plausible. They are underpinned by a purposive interpretation of UNSC Resolution 1593 (2005), resulting in a broad understanding of the obligation to "cooperate fully" with the ICC within the parameters of its Statute. In particular, both lines of reasoning depart from the assumption that the nonapplicability or waiving (whichever interpretation one prefers) of the customary immunity of President Bashir necessarily is implied by the obligation to "cooperate fully" in Resolution 1593 (2003) . Therefore, it does not need to be addressed explicitly in the resolution. 27 In so doing, these interpretations gave due consideration to the need for the effective implementation of binding UNSC decisions in line with the 1970 Namibia advisory opinion of the ICJ. 28 That decision concerned the UNSC Resolution that declared South Africa's presence in Namibia illegal, 29 without spelling out the implications for UN member states. The ICJ gave a purposive interpretation to the Resolution and determined that it required all states to recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence and to refrain from any acts that would imply the recognition of the legality of South Africa's presence. 30 All states thus had to accept the legal situation resulting from the UNSC binding decision and act in accordance with such acceptance. Anything less would undermine the efficacy of decisions of the UN organ entrusted with the primary responsibility for international peace and security. 31 If this reasoning is applied by analogy to UNSC Resolution 1593 (2005), it implies that the Chapter VII character of the obligation on Sudan to cooperate fully with the ICC allows all UN member states to regard the customary immunity of President Bashir as either nonapplicable or waived, in relation to any arrest by national authorities for the purpose of surrendering him to the ICC. 32 The purposive interpretation of broadly-formulated UNSC resolutions is also supported by state practice in general. For example, when the UNSC authorizes the use of military force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it usually uses the phrase "all necessary means" or "all necessary measures." It is generally accepted by states that this-by implication-would include all military measures, whether aerial or on the ground, unless any limitations are stipulated in the resolution. 33 If the UNSC can employ such general (i.e., vague) language when authorizing the most drastic of measures, namely, military force, it would only be consistent to accept that it 26 Bashir/South Africa 2017 decision, supra note 7, at para. 89. 27 However, see the minority opinion of Judge De Brichambaut; id. at para. 83. He submits that international law is unclear on this point.
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Conclusion
It is fair to conclude that a purposive interpretation of UNSC Resolution 1593 (2005 , combined with Articles 25 and 103 of the UN Charter, has removed the procedural bar that the customary immunities attached to President Bashir would otherwise have constituted in relation to his arrest by ICC member states and surrender to the ICC. However, the fact that the ICC is yet to develop a consistent line of reasoning pertaining to the relationship between UNSC Resolution 1593 (2005), Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute, and Article 98(1) of the Statute, is likely to form a point of contention in the scholarly debate in and of itself. For the ICC's position to gain credibility amongst scholars and states alike, it needs to develop and maintain a clear and consistent reasoning regarding this complex, triangular relationship.
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